The role of predictive features in retrieving analogical cases by Johnson, Hollyn M. & Seifert, Colleen M.
JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE 31, 648-667 (1992) 
The Role of Predictive Features in Retrieving Analogical Cases 
HOLLYN M. JOHNSON AND COLLEEN M. SEIFERT 
Access to prior cases in memory is a central issue in analogical reasoning. Previous 
research accounts for access in terms of overall similarity between complete new exemplars 
compared to complete stored instances and stresses the relative importance of surface-level 
similarities in access to complete cases (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Rattermann & Gentner, 
1987). However, for cross-domain remindings, abstract similarities capture the important 
commonalities between cases (&hank, 1982; Seifert, McKoon, Abelson, & Ratcliff, 1986). 
Therefore, models of analogy must account for structural-level remindings when they do 
occur in terms of abstract similarities. In planning and problem-solving tasks, a stored 
exemplar may be more useful if accessed before the new pattern is complete, when past 
experience can bring to bear possible solutions or warn of potential dangers while the 
outcome is yet undetermined. Further, different partial sets of abstract features may result 
in differing access to analogous cases. Features that predict when prior cases might be useful 
to problem solving could serve as better retrieval cues than other abstract cues that are 
equally similar, yet less distinctive to the specific problem situation. To test these hypoth- 
eses, several experiments were conducted using thematic stories in a modification of the 
reminding paradigm developed by Gentner and Landers (1985). By examining the relative 
effectiveness of subsets of features in accessing relevant cases, it was found that a subset of 
abstract cue features predicting when a planning failure might occur led to more reliable 
access to complete prior analogies than did a subset of abstract features expressing specific 
information about planning decisions and outcomes. Further experiments show that how 
distinctly the feature sets characterize the conditions leading up to the planning decision 
point, and not differences in the overall similarity to the case, determines access based on 
abstract cues. 0 1992 Academic Press, Inc. 
Previous research has demonstrated the 
utility of analogical reasoning in learning 
(Pirolli & Anderson, 1985; Ross, 1989b) and 
in problem solving (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). 
Novices often rely on specific examples as 
they learn a new task, before they learn 
general principles (Pirolli & Anderson, 
1985), and comparing a series of analogous 
problems can lead to induction of more ab- 
stract problem-solving schemas (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; Ross, 1989a). Others have 
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proposed models of planning, such as case- 
based reasoning, that involve accessing 
cases from memory and applying them to 
new situations (Hammond, 1989; Kolod- 
ner, 1983; Riesbeck & Schank, 1989). How- 
ever, before one can map a previous exam- 
ple to a current problem, one must retrieve 
a relevant candidate case from memory. 
By most accounts, retrieval depends on 
how similar the new problem is to an exam- 
ple stored in memory. In Tversky’s (1977) 
iufluential model, similarity is a function of 
the number of shared features minus the 
number of distinctive features, with each 
shared feature contributing equally to over- 
all similarity. Other researchers have pro- 
posed that overall similarity determines ac- 
cess to potential analogs in memory 
(Anderson, 1986; Gentner & Landers, 
1985). Much recent work, however, has fo- 
cused on distinguishing different kinds of 
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similarity and determining how they may 
affect retrieval. A distinction has been 
made between structural and superficial 
features (Gentnet, 1983; Holyoak, 1985), 
where the former are relations among prob- 
lem elements and the latter are features that 
do not enter into any relational structure. 
Gentner and associates (Gentner & 
Landers, 1985; Rattermann & Gentner, 
1987) found that surface or superficial fea- 
tures result in more frequent access, and 
Ross (1987) has provided further evidence 
that different kinds of superficial similarity 
(story line versus object correspondence) 
lead to different rates of access, although 
both studies found a significant number of 
remindings based on structural features 
alone. Novick (1988) has found that novices 
and experts attend to different kinds of sim- 
ilarity, and other work (Seifert, McKoon, 
Abelson, & Ratcliff, 1986) has found that 
retrieval can occur based solely on more 
abstract, relational features. 
Some types of abstract similarities that 
instances may have in common have been 
characterized by research investigating 
knowledge structures in memory. Some 
proposed knowledge structures include plot 
units (Lehnert, 1980), macrostructures (van 
Dijk, 1979), thematic organization points 
(TOPS) (Schank, 1982), and thematic ab- 
straction units (TAUs) (Dyer, 1983). They 
capture shared relationships between con- 
cepts, such as interactions between goals 
and plans (Schank, 1982), without being 
context dependent. The features involved 
in these abstract characterizations could 
thus be termed “structural.” Such knowl- 
edge structures have received psychologi- 
cal validation in work by Seifert et al. 
(1986), Lehnert, Black, and Reiser (1981), 
and Seifert, Dyer, and Black (1986). 
Although some research has found suc- 
cessful retrieval based on abstract features 
(Gentner & Landers, 1985; Rattermann & 
Gentner, 1987; Seifert et al., 1986), little 
work has been done on the role of different 
kinds of abstract similarities in accessing 
instances stored in memory. Similarities 
based on abstract features are particularly 
important in accounting for the subset of 
remindings that are not based on superficial 
similarities. In cross-contextual remind- 
ings, abstract strategies from one domain 
are applied in another, such as taking the 
“fork” strategy from chess and developing 
it as the “option” play in football (Collins, 
1987). When one encounters a problem in a 
novel domain, one may find few superficial 
similarities available for retrieving a rele- 
vant and potentially helpful instance from 
memory. In other situations, ubiquitous su- 
perficial features may not be sufficient to 
distinguish one prior case from others in 
memory. Because such cross-domain re- 
mindings do occur naturally, it is important 
to understand how this access based on 
structural similarity occurs. 
The theory of case-based reasoning 
(Hammond, 1989; Kolodner, 1983; Ries- 
beck & Schank, 1989; Schank, 1982) pro- 
poses that memory access to abstract anal- 
ogies is determined on the basis of the func- 
tionality of case information. In a 
functionally organized memory, one en- 
codes goal-relevant cues, such as ones that 
predict potential problems before they oc- 
cur. Such cues are used to index knowledge 
structures containing planning information 
on how to avoid those problems. With 
these features as indices in memory, one 
will retrieve previous instances having 
those features in the course of understand- 
ing a new case. 
This functional perspective assumes it 
will be advantageous to retrieve a prior 
case based on abstract similarities at the 
time when they can provide information 
that is helpful in the current situation. This 
would require indexing prior cases based 
on the abstract features that will be appar- 
ent to the processor at the time when re- 
trieval would be most useful. For example, 
in planning situations, this point would oc- 
cur when one knows the planning condi- 
tions and constraints and is considering 
what action to take. Retrieving an appropri- 
ate case from memory at that point could 
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provide a potential solution, or a warning 
about a past planning failure to avoid. In the 
latter case, features that predict when a po- 
tential planning failure might occur would 
be the most useful retrieval cues. There- 
fore, if human memory is indeed function- 
ally organized, cases sharing abstract fea- 
tures predictive of future planning failures 
should lead to better access than cases 
sharing other abstract but nonpredictive 
features. In either case, retrieval would not 
be based on a whole-to-whole match (as in 
Gentner & Landers, 1985, and Rattermann 
& Gentner, 1987), but on matching from a 
current incomplete exemplar. 
Different subsets of abstract features 
could lead to better access for several rea- 
sons, One is that predictive feature sets 
may simply contain more information than 
other subsets of abstract features and thus 
are more similar to past cases in memory. 
However, under a functional memory hy- 
pothesis, even when two sets of cues have 
equivalent similarity to a target case in 
memory, features related to the planning 
decision should produce a retrieval advan- 
tage. Predictive features may more dis- 
tinctly characterize relevant planning 
cases, leading to remindings appropriate to 
the planning decision and avoiding retrieval 
of irrelevant cases. Other types of feature 
sets may share features with a number of 
different planning situations and thus could 
lead to many spurious remindings in addi- 
tion to appropriate ones. 
The experiments presented here investi- 
gate this “predictive-features” hypothesis. 
However, before investigating what types 
of abstract features lead to useful access to 
cases, the utility of subsets of abstract fea- 
tures in retrieval must be established. Pre- 
vious work on access in analogical remind- 
ing (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Landers, 
1985; Rattermann 8z Gentner, 1987) has 
used examples and stories with complete 
structures. In addition, most knowledge 
structure theories try to characterize whole 
events, themes, or episodes (Dyer, 1983; 
Schank, 1982). For example, a planning ep- 
isode would include planning conditions, 
constraints, the action taken, and the out- 
come. Prior work on successful access to 
analogies, then, has either focused on 
matching entire test cases to cases in mem- 
ory, or has not systematically examined the 
issue of incomplete feature sets (Gentner & 
Landers, 1985; Holyoak, 1985; Ross, 
1989a). A first experiment will determine 
whether one can in fact reliably access old 
instances based on a “partial” versus a 
“complete” set of features. To support the 
predictive-features hypothesis, it must first 
be established that such partial feature sets 
provide sufficient commonalities to allow 
access to previous cases in memory. 
INTRODUCTION TOEXPERIMENTS 
All of the experiments used stories based 
on thematic abstraction units (TAUs) 
(Dyer, 1983), which were selected because 
of their relevance to planning. TAUs are 
based on abstract interactions of goals and 
plans as reflected in familiar cultural adages 
(such as, “counting your chickens before 
they’ve hatched”), especially those involv- 
ing common expectation and planning fail- 
ures, and so are likely to be familiar to sub- 
jects. The fact that the adages underlying 
TAUs have been developed within this cul- 
ture suggests that they express knowledge 
valuable in many situations (e.g., not just 
those involving “chickens”). TAUs may 
contain planning information about prob- 
lems that can occur and how to avoid or 
solve them and serve to organize storage of 
individual episodes in memory, so that 
cases having the same theme are stored 
with similar indices. For example, Table 1 
shows two stories that can be characterized 
with the abstraction “counting your chick- 
ens before they’ve hatched,” but which 
contain different content features. The the- 
matic relations among the stories used in 
these experiments were validated by Seifert 
et al. (1986), who found that subjects could 
reliably detect these thematic similarities 
and use them to sort the stories into distinct 
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE STUDY AND TEST STORIES 
Study story 
Judy was ovejoyed about the fact that she was pregnant. She looked forward to having a baby boy, and 
wanted one so badly she felt absolutely certain it would be male. As a result, she bought all kinds of toy 
cars, trucks, miniature army soldiers, and even arranged an extravagant “It’s a boy” party. Finally, the big 
moment came, and she was rushed to the hospital. Everything went smoothly in the delivery room, and at 
last she knew. Judy’s lively bouncing baby was actually a girl. 
Complete-theme test story 
Harrison disliked his small apartment and shabby furniture. His rich aunt Agatha was near death, and 
although he hadn’t seen or spoken to her in 15 years, he felt assured of inheriting a great fortune very 
shortly because he was her only living relative. He had already thought of plenty of ways to spend a lot of 
money fixing his place up. Confident of his inheritance, Harrison began charging everything from color 
televisions to cars to gourmet groceries. When Aunt Agatha finally died and her will was read, she had left 
all her millions to the butler and now Harrison was in debt. 
Predict-theme test story 
Harrison disliked his small apartment and shabby furniture. His rich aunt Agatha was near death, and 
although he hadn’t seen or spoken to her in 15 years, he felt assured of inheriting a great fortune very 
shortly because he was her only living relative. He had already thought of plenty of ways to spend a lot of 
money fixing his place up. 
Outcome-theme test story 
Confident of his inheritance, Harrison began charging everything from color televisions to cars to gourmet 
groceries. When Aunt Agatha finally died and her will was read, she had left all her millions to the butler 
and now Harrison was in debt. 
groups, even though the stories differ in 
setting and other contextual features. 
Experiments 1 and 2 used a reminding 
paradigm based on Gentner and Landers 
(1985), where a study set of stories are read, 
followed by a later test where cue stories 
are presented and subjects are asked to re- 
port any remindings of the study stories. 
Although this task does not directly involve 
problem solving, Ross (1987) has supported 
these reminding results using a problem- 
solving task. This suggests that the remind- 
ing paradigm allows examination of access 
in circumstances that do apply to problem 
solving. Further, truly spontaneous re- 
mindings may be rare in problem-solving 
situations as well. Even in research involv- 
ing a problem-solving paradigm (e.g., Rei- 
ser and Faries, 1988; Ross, 1989a), subjects 
are encouraged to refer back to earlier ex- 
amples in solving new problems, which can 
be viewed as a hint that old instances are 
relevant and should be accessed. 
In the present experiments, subjects 
studied TAU-based stories in the first 
phase, and then in a later phase were tested 
with stories based on the same TAUs orig- 
inally studied, but sharing no surface or 
content features. Each TAU-based test 
story had three versions: a complete theme, 
a predict theme, and a theme outcome. Ta- 
ble 1 shows the test versions of a sample 
story and its paired study story. Experi- 
ment 1 used test stories having either a full 
set of thematic features (complete theme) 
or a subset of those features that provided 
only the initial thematic elements (predict 
theme) to compare access based on incom- 
plete exemplars to that found with com- 
plete overlap of abstract features. To inves- 
tigate the effectiveness of predictive fea- 
tures versus other potential sets of 
incomplete thematic features, Experiment 
2 used as test stories both “predict-theme” 
stories, which presented the subset of the- 
matic elements leading up to a decision 
point and “theme-outcome” stories, con- 
taining the subset of thematic features in- 
cluding just the planning decision and its 
outcome. In Experiments 3 and 4, subjects 
rated overall and thematic similarity, re- 
spectively, for each test story version to its 
paired study story with the same TAU pat- 
tern. Using a direct comparison instead of a 
memory task assesses whether similarity 
alone could account for the rates of access 
in Experiment 2. Finally, Experiment 5 
used the same set of predict-theme and 
theme-outcome stories as in Experiment 2, 
but had subjects perform the matching task 
by comparing the study and test stories di- 
rectly rather than from memory, in order to 
further assess the two story types’ distinc- 
tiveness within the set of study stories. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
This experiment tested whether subjects 
could reliably use abstract features to ac- 
cess cases, even when given an incomplete 
feature set as a cue. Subjects were tested 
with (a) full-length thematic stories that 
presented initial conditions potentially 
leading to a planning failure, the planning 
decision made, and its outcome (complete- 
theme), or (b) thematic stories that only set 
up conditions for a planning failure but did 
not allow certain identification of a theme 
(predict-theme). If the predict-theme sto- 
ries, which present only a partial thematic 
structure, lead to remindings at a rate no 
higher than that expected by chance, this 
would cast some doubt on the predictive- 
features hypothesis. Further, by comparing 
predict-theme story results to those for 
complete-theme stories, we can put bounds 
on the potential effectiveness of partial fea- 
ture sets. 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-four University of Michi- 
gan undergraduates participated in a single 
session lasting about 1 h. They received 
course credit in an introductory psychology 
class for participating. Subjects were run in 
groups of two to six. 
Materials. The materials consisted of 
eight pairs of stories, each set based on a 
different thematic abstraction unit (TAU), 
as developed by Dyer (1983), and four ad- 
ditional thematic stories without matches, 
used as fillers (see Table 1 for sample test 
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and study stories). All the stories reflected 
familiar adages such as “don’t count your 
chickens before they’ve hatched.” Seven 
story pairs were drawn from materials used 
by Seifert et al. (1986) in testing the validity 
of these knowledge structures, and an 
eighth pair was added. These stories in- 
cluded thematic, but not contextual, simi- 
larities. The four filler stories also con- 
tained adage-based themes, but they did 
not duplicate those used in the target story 
pairs. 
One story from each of the eight target 
pairs was presented in a study packet. Each 
story ranged from 75 to 95 words. Six study 
packets were prepared, each containing the 
same eight stories in random order. Test 
packets contained the other eight stories 
from the target pairs and four filler stories. 
Each of the eight target stories in the test 
packet was presented in one of two ver- 
sions: a complete-theme version (80-95 
words) that included the initial elements of 
the thematic pattern as well as the conclu- 
sion or outcome of the story and a predict- 
theme version (40-50 words) that dupli- 
cated the initial elements of the complete- 
theme version but did not include the 
conclusion or resolution of the story. Table 
2 shows an example of the thematic fea- 
TABLE 2 
EXAMPLE OF PREDICTIVE FEATURES IN ONE STORY 
Key: A letter by a story element means that the 
story version contains that element. 
S Study story 
C Complete-theme test story 
P Predict-theme test story 
0 Outcome-theme test story 
Theme: Counting your chickens before they’ve 
hatched 
Elements: 
SCP (I) X desires A. 
SCP (2) X assumes A. 
SCP (3) X does not act to ensure or 
verify A. 
SC 0 (4) X invests resources based on A. 
SC 0 (5) A does not occur. 
c 0 (6) X has used up resources for 
nothing. 
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tures present in each type of story. Each 
predict-theme story provided enough infor- 
mation to set up conditions under which the 
planning failure reflected in its theme could 
occur, but was truncated to exclude infor- 
mation about whether a planning failure did 
occur and what its outcome was. The pre- 
dictive features selected were those that 
one could perceive before the decision 
point in a planning situation and that would 
reasonably lead to expectations about what 
might occur next. Appendix A shows the 
adage-based themes and thematic features 
present for each target story pair used. 
Each subject received four predict-theme 
test stories and four complete-theme test 
stories, each uniquely corresponding to one 
of the study stories. The pairing of study 
story to complete-theme or predict-theme 
test story was counterbalanced across sub- 
jects, and all 12 test stories were placed in 
randomized order for each subject. Each 
subject received the same four filler stories. 
Each of the test stories was followed by 
these instructions taken from Gentner and 
Landers (1985): 
IF THIS STORY REMINDS YOU OF A 
STORY FROM THE FIRST PART OF THE 
EXPERIMENT, PLEASE WRITE OUT THE 
MATCHING STORY AS COMPLETELY AS 
YOU CAN. TRY TO INCLUDE THE NAMES 
OF CHARACTERS, THEIR MOTIVES, AND 
WHAT HAPPENED. 
Blank lines were provided for subjects to 
describe the study story brought to mind. 
To allow for multiple remindings, addi- 
tional space was provided for each test 
story, along with instructions to add any 
other remindings. 
Procedure. The reminding procedure de- 
veloped by Gentner and Landers (1985) 
was modified to allow testing in a single, l-h 
session by including a short intervening 
task. Subjects first received a study packet 
and were instructed to read through the sto- 
ries and study them for 5 min, as they 
would be tested on them later, All subjects 
read all the stories at least once in this study 
period. After 5 min the study packets were 
collected and subjects worked on an unre- 
lated distractor task for 10 min. Then, in the 
test phase, subjects received the test pack- 
ets and verbal instructions that they should 
work forward in the test booklet and not 
return to prior pages. They were also told 
that there were no answers to some of the 
reminding problems in the test packet, and 
if an answer did not come to them relatively 
quickly they were to go on to the next page. 
After finishing this phase, free recall 
memory for the study stories was tested. 
Subjects were asked to write down brief 
phrases identifying stories they could recall 
from the study packet. They were given a 
few minutes to do this and were not allowed 
to look back through the test packet. 
Results 
Each page of the test packet was coded 
by story type (complete-theme, predict- 
theme, or filler) and response type (match, 
mismatch, or null). Mention of the corre- 
sponding story from the study packet 
counted as a match, whether it occurred as 
the first or second response on a page; only 
3.3% of all responses were listed as second 
responses. Filler stories by definition had 
no matches. A mismatch was coded if the 
response indicated a story in the study set 
that did not have the same theme as the test 
story. A null was coded if the subject made 
no response or made a response that could 
not be identified as one of the study stories. 
The latter, termed intrusions, accounted for 
4.6% of the responses. 
Subjects on average wrote 4.4 responses 
as remindings in the test portion and re- 
called a mean of 4.8 study stories in the free 
recall at the end of the experiment. The 
overlap of these two measures was high. 
For each subject, two conditional probabil- 
ities were calculated: (a) that of recalling a 
certain story given that it was reported as a 
reminding (p(recalllreminding) = .87) and 
(b) that of reporting a certain story as a re- 
minding given that it was reported in free 
recall (p(remindinglrecal1) = .79). The 
number of study stories each subject had 
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available in memory was calculated as the 
total number of different stories reported as 
recalls or remindings (or both); this mean 
was 5.5. 
Table 3 shows the mean proportion of 
matches and mismatches for each story 
type. A t test of matches for complete- 
theme versus predict-theme stories was sig- 
nificant with subjects as a random factor, 
t(53) = 3.8, p < .OOOl, and showed a trend 
toward significance with materials as a ran- 
dom factor, t(14) = 1.76, p < .lO. I tests of 
mismatches for the two story types showed 
a trend toward significance under a subjects 
analysis, t(53) = 1.64, p < .l 1, but was not 
significant in a materials analysis. 
To determine whether the number of re- 
sponses to complete-themes and to predict- 
themes differed from chance, these means 
were tested against two estimates of chance 
performance. First, subjects’ reported 
complete-theme and predict-theme 
matches were corrected by a factor based 
on the probability of reporting any story 
from the study set (. 125) and the number of 
responses each subject actually made in the 
test phase of the experiment (whole set 
method). Both complete-theme matches 
and predict-theme matches were signifi- 
cantly different from this chance estimate, 
t(54) = 10.07 and t(54) = 8.22, respec- 
tively; p < .OOOl for both. For complete- 
theme stories, subjects’ scores on average 
exceeded the score expected by chance by 
1.27 observations; for predict-themes, the 
mean was .88 observations. A second esti- 
mate, looking at performance only on trials 
where the subject had the matching story 
available in memory, with “available” de- 
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE PROPORTION OF RESPONSES BY ALL STORY 













fined as a story reported as a recall or re- 
minding (memory set method), also showed 
that both complete-themes and predict- 
themes were matched at higher-than- 
chance levels, t(53) = 8.17 and t(53) = 
7.57, respectively; p < .OOOl for both. 
To test the rate of mismatches and nulls 
across all three story types (complete, pre- 
dict, tiller), two 1 x 3 analyses of variance 
were performed. The story types did not 
differ in the proportion of mismatch re- 
sponses when analyzed either by subjects 
or materials, but did differ in proportion of 
null responses under both analyses, min 
F’(1,23) = 16.55, p < .0005, with filler sto- 
ries showing the highest proportion of null 
responses. The mean number of nulls for 
fillers, predict-themes, and complete- 
themes were .89, .54, and .35, respectively. 
Discussion 
The results show that one can reliably 
access previous cases in memory using a 
partial set of abstract features. Both of the 
chance measures used show that partial 
stories lead to appropriate remindings at a 
level higher than expected by chance. Be- 
cause the estimates of chance performance 
assumed a response for each trial, they rep- 
resent a conservative measure, as subjects 
often left spaces blank. These estimates 
may therefore underestimate the degree of 
access provided by a partial-features con- 
dition. The complete-theme condition rep- 
licates the finding that abstract similarities 
in thematic patterns of features can be reli- 
ably used to retrieve related cases from 
memory (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Ratter- 
mann & Gentner, 1987; Seifert et al., 1986). 
The low response rate for filler stories 
shows that subjects could discriminate the- 
matically related stories from unrelated 
ones and that both the complete-theme sto- 
ries and the predict-theme stories contained 
enough information to allow subjects to do 
so. Further, the low mismatch rates for 
both types of thematic stories show that 
the matches were not simply due to guess- 
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ing; if so, many more spurious remindings 
might be expected than were observed. 
Conditional probability results provide 
some evidence that subjects were retrieving 
cases from memory based on the test cues 
and not just using a strategy of keeping the 
whole study set in mind and serially com- 
paring each study story to the test story. 
With a strategic search, one would expect 
subjects to recall all the items they put 
down as remindings and vice versa, which 
would result in conditional probabilities of 
1.0. However, the probability of a remind- 
ing given free recall of the story later was 
.79, suggesting that at least some remind- 
ings were not drawn from a search set. The 
final free recall is at best ambiguous evi- 
dence of an initial search set, as subjects 
did this task last, under no time constraints, 
and the stories retrieved from memory dur- 
ing the reminding task may have remained 
accessible and thus inflated the recall 
score. Further, subjects were only exposed 
to the study stories for 5 min, which al- 
lowed most to read through each story only 
once, and limited further rehearsal, as did 
the subsequent distractor task. 
The finding that complete stories resulted 
in more matches than the partial stories did 
is as expected: The complete stories pro- 
vide more retrieval cues, which would be 
more likely to lead to access, and would 
also allow more complete reconstruction of 
the original story. As such, the complete- 
theme condition seems to place an upper 
bound on the potential effectiveness of par- 
tial feature sets. 
In summary, these results indicate that 
people can use abstract features to access 
previous material, even when given only a 
portion of the complete feature set. Such 
features could lead to remindings when the 
most important similarities between two 
cases are abstract ones, and in general, use 
of partial feature sets is particularly impor- 
tant in a planning or problem-solving con- 
text, where one would not have a complete 
set of features to work with. Given these 
results, we can now look at whether, in 
cross-contextual situations where informa- 
tion is incomplete, different types of ab- 
stract feature sets result in better access to 
related prior cases. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
If functionality is an organizing memory 
principle for structures like TAUs, as case- 
based reasoning theory suggests (Schank, 
1982), then features in an input that predict 
a failure should form a privileged set that 
leads to more reliable access than would be 
attained using other sets of abstract fea- 
tures. Optimally, one should access a rele- 
vant theme after receiving information crit- 
ical to the planning decision, but before de- 
ciding upon and taking an action. 
To determine whether predictive features 
provide an advantage in retrieval, the re- 
minding paradigm was used. As in Experi- 
ment 1, subjects received a set of study sto- 
ries first, but in this experiment all the test 
stories were incomplete exemplars. Half of 
the stories (predict-themes) presented only 
elements leading up to a decision point, 
whereas the other half (theme-outcomes) 
only contained a planning decision and an 
outcome. The predictive-features hypothe- 
sis predicts that the most useful time to re- 
trieve the study story is before the decision 
is made and executed. Thus, stories con- 
taining features that predict bad outcomes 
for certain planning decisions should bring 
to mind past instances of the failure. Re- 
mindings based on other abstract feature 
sets, however, would not provide one with 
the opportunity to avoid a planning failure 
and so would be less functional. Thus, un- 
der a predictive features hypothesis, one 
would not expect privileged access based 
on theme-outcome stories, which provide 
only the outcome of an incident, too late to 
benefit current planning. 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-four University of Michi- 
gan undergraduates participated in a single 
session lasting about 1 h. They received 
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course credit in an introductory psychology 
class for participating and were run in 
groups of six to ten. 
Materials. The materials consisted of a 
study packet, a test packet, and a distractor 
task. The study packet and distractor task 
were the same as those used in Experiment 
1. Ten study packets, each containing the 
same eight stories in random order, were 
used. 
The test packets, as in Experiment 1, 
contained eight test stories, each of which 
shared a theme with one of the study sto- 
ries, and four fillers, which were based on 
adages not represented in the study stories. 
All 12 test stories had two versions: a pre- 
dict-theme version (60-70 words), which in- 
cluded the initial elements of a thematic 
pattern but not the conclusion or resolution 
of the story, and a theme-outcome version 
(4&50 words), which presented only the 
planning step taken and outcome of the 
story. See Table 1 for sample predict-theme 
and theme-outcome test story versions. 
The abstract features characterizing an 
example target theme, and the elements its 
test and study story contained, are pre- 
sented in Table 2. The predictive features 
chosen were those that one could perceive 
before the decision point in a planning sit- 
uation and that would reasonably lead one 
to expectations about what might occur 
next. The theme-outcome features were the 
remaining elements, that is, the planning 
decision and its consequences. The test sto- 
ries were partitioned into mutually exclu- 
sive feature sets, to eliminate elements 
common to both versions. 
Each subject received four target predict- 
theme stories, four target outcome-themes, 
and four fillers (two in predict-theme for- 
mat and two in outcome-theme format). 
The counterbalancing and randomization of 
stories, and the instructions after each of 
the test stories, were the same as those in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same 
as that in Experiment 1, except that the in- 
structions for the test packet and the free 
recall task were written, as opposed to be- 
ing delivered verbally. 
Results 
Responses were coded using the same 
criteria as those in Experiment 1, for both 
subjects and materials analyses. Only 
2.59% of the responses occurred as the sec- 
ond of a double reminding. Responses that 
could not be identified as one of the target 
stories (intrusions) accounted for 5.5% of 
the responses. 
Subjects wrote down a mean of 3.67 re- 
sponses as remindings and could recall, on 
average, 4.74 study stories in the free-recall 
phase. As in Experiment 1, the overlap of 
these two measures was high. The average 
probability of reporting a certain story as a 
free recall given that it was reported as a 
reminding (p(recallJreminding)) was .89, 
and the mean probability of reporting a cer- 
tain story as a reminding given that it was 
recalled at the end (p(remindinglrecal1)) was 
.71. The mean number of study stories sub- 
jects had available in memory (the number 
of different stories that were reported as 
recalls or remindings or both) was 5.06. 
A t test of the number of matches in re- 
sponse to predict-theme versus theme- 
outcome stories was not significant with ei- 
ther subjects or materials as a random fac- 
tor. However, mismatches in response to 
theme-outcome stories occurred signifi- 
cantly more often than they did in response 
to predict-themes, t(53) = 2.99, p < .004; 
t(14) = 2.44, p < .029, for subjects and 
materials analyses, respectively. Table 4 
shows the mean proportion of matches and 
mismatches for each story type. 
The mean number of responses to pre- 
dict-theme stories and to theme-outcomes 
was tested against the two chance estimates 
used in Experiment 1. Using the whole set 
method, where subjects’ reported predict- 
theme matches and theme-outcome 
matches were corrected by a factor estimat- 
ing chance performance, predict-theme 
matches occurred at a rate significantly 
higher than the chance estimate, t(53) = 
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7.33, p < .Ol. Theme-outcome matches, 
however, showed only a trend towards a 
difference, t(53) = 2.02, p < .lO. For the 
predict-theme condition, the average num- 
ber of observations exceeded the chance 
estimate by SOO; for outcome-themes, this 
figure was .204. The memory set method, 
which looked at performance only on trials 
where the subject had the matching story 
available in memory, showed that both pre- 
dict-themes and theme-outcomes were 
matched at a higher-than-chance level, t(53) 
= 6.24 and t(53) = 5.46, respectively; p < 
.OOl for both. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment suggest 
that predictive features show an advantage 
in terms of selectivity of reminding. The 
predict-theme and theme-outcome stories 
did not differ in number of matches, which 
suggests that they both provide reliable ac- 
cess to related cases; however, they did dif- 
fer in number of mismatches generated. 
This could indicate that the elements in the 
predict-theme stories distinguished the 
themes more clearly, and thus subjects 
tended either to find the right story or to 
give no answer. The theme-outcomes, how- 
ever, tended to evoke a wider range of 
cases as responses, indicating that the fea- 
tures they provide were shared by other po- 
tentially retrievable episodes. Such out- 
come cues may not have the specificity 
found in the initial predictive elements and 
thus could lead to spurious matches as well 
as accurate ones. For example, several 
TAUs deal with resource allocation; one 
might access any of them given only infor- 
mation that “resources were wasted.” 
The comparison of responses to predict- 
theme stories and theme-outcomes using 
the whole set chance estimates supports 
this view. This chance estimate looks at 
how likely subjects are to discriminate the 
thematic stories from the fillers and, having 
done that, to pick the “right” answer from 
the chosen stories. These estimates show 
that subjects matched predict-theme stories 
at a higher-than-chance rate, whereas they 
responded to theme-outcome stories at 
closer to chance levels. Subjects put down 
a greater number of inappropriate re- 
sponses to theme-outcomes. 
However, when using the memory set 
chance measure, subjects reported both 
predict-themes and theme-outcomes at 
rates significantly better than chance. This 
measure looks at only those test stories that 
the subject, given the stories he or she had 
in memory, could potentially have matched 
correctly. For example, if the study story 
about Mike were the appropriate response, 
but the subject did not report that story in 
either the reminding or the free-recall por- 
tion of the experiment, the corresponding 
test story would not be included among the 
set that the subject could have potentially 
matched. Thus, any response given for that 
test story would be ignored, rather than be- 
ing counted as an error (as would occur in 
the whole set method). Comparing these 
two estimates, it appears that if one had the 
appropriate theme-outcome available in 
memory, one could put it where it be- 
longed, as with the predict-themes. How- 
ever, if one did not have the right response 
available, theme-outcomes allowed access 
to other exemplars that might do, whereas 
predict-themes, being more specific, led to 
either matching or no response. 
Thus, Experiment 2 provides evidence of 
access to prior cases based on both types of 
feature sets. However, the evidence shows 
predict-theme features lead to more reliable 
access, perhaps because of the specificity 
in matching they provide compared to 
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theme-outcome features. This distinctive- 
ness property is examined further in Exper- 
iment 5. However, an alternate explanation 
for these results may lie in a differential de- 
gree of similarity between the cue types and 
the target stories. Experiments 3 and 4 
were designed to determine whether simi- 
larity alone could account for these differ- 
ences in accessibility. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The advantage for predict-themes in ac- 
cess to prior cases has been explained in 
terms of the functional purpose of the re- 
mindings. An alternative explanation for 
this finding is that the two feature sets differ 
in overall similarity to the study stories and 
that this alone accounts for differences in 
access. To determine whether the thematic 
test stories in the two conditions were dif- 
ferentially similar to the study stories, sub- 
jects rated the overall similarity of the pairs 
of stories used in the previous two experi- 
ments. The comparisons included themati- 
cally related stories and filler stories, either 
in complete-theme, predict-theme, or 
theme-outcome versions. If the results in 
the ratings task, where subjects need not 
rely on memory for the stories, show that 
subjects judge predict-themes as more sim- 
ilar overall to study stories than theme- 
outcomes are, this would suggest that the 
differences can be explained by a greater 
similarity to the targets in the predict-theme 
condition, rather than by any predictive or 
functional role they may play. However, if 
predict-themes and theme-outcomes do not 
differ in overall similarity, it would support 
the claim that the differences found be- 
tween predict-theme and theme-outcome 
test stories were due to their differing effec- 
tiveness as distinctive memory retrieval 
cues. 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 60 Univer- 
sity of Michigan undergraduates who did 
this task as part of another experiment. 
Subjects were paid for their participation 
and were run in groups of 18 to 20. 
Materials and procedure. The materials 
consisted of the eight study stories used in 
Experiments 1 and 2, their corresponding 
thematic test stories, and the four filler test 
stories used in both experiments. Each the- 
matic test story and filler story had three 
versions: the complete-theme version used 
in Experiment 1, the predict-theme version 
used in Experiment 2, and the theme- 
outcome version used in Experiment 2. 
Each study story was paired with its match 
(using ail three versions) and with a filler 
chosen at random (also using all three ver- 
sions), for a total of six rating conditions for 
each story. Each of the four fillers was 
paired with two different study stories at 
random. 
Each study story occurred only once in 
each ratings packet, being paired with one 
of its six test stories. The test story pairings 
were counterbalanced in a Latin square de- 
sign, with two constraints: (1) that a partic- 
ular version type (complete-theme, predict- 
theme, or theme-outcome) occurred no 
more than three times in any packet, and (2) 
that each packet contained four tiller and 
four thematic stories. This last constraint 
prevented any filler from appearing twice in 
the same ratings packet. Within each 
packet the pairs of stories were placed in 
random order. Each ratings page in the 
packet featured a complete study story, fol- 
lowed by its paired test story. Following 
this was a scale, ranging from 1 to 7, on 
which the subject rated the overall similar- 
ity of the stories, with 1 being “not very 
similar” and 7 being “very similar.” Each 
page contained only one story pair and rat- 
ing scale. The instructions were to rate the 
overall similarity of the pairs of stories, 
working forward through the packet. 
Results 
The ratings were analyzed in a 2 X 3 anal- 
ysis of variance with type of story (thematic 
or filler) and story version (complete- 
theme, predict-theme, or theme-outcome) 
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as factors. The average ratings for each 
condition are shown in Table 5. 
The results showed a significant main ef- 
fect of story type for both subjects and ma- 
terials, min F’(1,37) = 93.16, p < .OOOl, 
with thematic stories receiving higher rat- 
ings. Story version also showed a main ef- 
fect, with complete-theme stories receiving 
the highest ratings overall, followed by 
theme-outcomes, and then by predict- 
themes. This was significant under both 
subjects and materials analyses, min 
F’(2,16) = 6.26, p < .Ol. 
Further planned comparisons tested the 
difference between the predict-theme and 
theme-outcome conditions for thematic sto- 
ries and filler stories separately. The anal- 
ysis of thematic stories showed a trend un- 
der both subjects and materials analyses, 
t(58) = 1.88, p < .065 and t(7) = 1.99, p < 
.087, respectively, with theme-outcome 
stories being judged more similar to the 
study stories than predict-theme stories 
were. For filler stories, this result was sig- 
nificant under both subjects and materials 
analyses, $58) = 3.22, p < .002; t(7) = 
3.68, p < .008, respectively. 
Discussion 
Most importantly, the results suggest 
that the memory advantage of predict- 
themes cannot be explained by a greater 
overall similarity to the study stories com- 
pared to the theme-outcomes. In fact, sub- 
jects rated theme-outcomes as having more 
overall similarity to the study stories using 
this direct comparison rating method in- 
TABLE 5 
AVERAGE RATINGS OF STORIES BY STORY TYPE AND 










stead of a reminding task. That theme- 
outcome stories were rated higher than pre- 
dict-theme stories is mainly accounted for 
by differences among the filler story ratings 
(see Table 5). With the filler stories, sub- 
jects’ ratings may reflect vague similarities 
to the target case, such as “sharing nega- 
tive outcomes.” Noticing vague similarities 
could result in higher ratings in direct com- 
parison, but could lead to unreliable and 
spurious remindings in a task involving 
memory access. For story version differ- 
ences, the finding that complete-theme sto- 
ries had the highest ratings is not surprising 
because they contained more information 
that could potentially enter into a match. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 3 looked at the alternative 
explanation that overall similarity accounts 
for the advantage for predict-themes in ac- 
cess to prior cases. However, one could 
still argue that the predict-theme stories al- 
low more reliable access because they have 
more specifically thematic features in com- 
mon with the study stories than theme- 
outcome stories do. To determine whether 
the thematic test stories in the two condi- 
tions were differentially similar to the study 
stories at this level, subjects rated the the- 
matic, rather than the overall, similarity of 
the pairs of stories used in Experiments 1 
and 2, using the same procedure as in Ex- 
periment 3. If subjects can reliably detect 
thematic similarities in all the thematic con- 
ditions, it would suggest that the differ- 
ences found between predict-theme and 
theme-outcome test stories were due to 
their differing effectiveness as memory re- 
trieval cues. On the other hand, if the re- 
sults in the ratings task, where subjects 
need not rely on memory for the stories, 
show that subjects judge predict-themes as 
more thematically similar to study stories 
than theme-outcomes are, this would sug- 
gest that the differences can be explained 
by their having greater similarity to the tar- 
gets. 
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Method TABLE 6 
Subjects. The subjects were 21 Univer- 
sity of Michigan undergraduates who did 
the ratings as a subtask embedded within 
another experiment. They received course 
credit in an introductory psychology class 
for their participation. Subjects were run 
individually. 
AVERAGE RATINGS OF STORIES BY STORY TYPE AND 
VERSION, EXPERIMENT 4 
Story version Theme Filler 
Complete 4.98 2.67 
Theme-outcome 4.23 2.16 
Predict-theme 4.04 1.51 
Materials. The materials used were the 
same as those in Experiment 3, except for 
the instructions and the rating scales. These 
were based on those used by Gentner and 
Landers (1985) with a few modifications to 
emphasize use of thematic features regard- 
less of story length. Subjects were told that 
they needn’t see the whole story to get the 
point and to see its similarity to other sto- 
ries. This was done to focus subjects on the 
stories’ content and limit their use of the 
stories’ length as a factor in their ratings. 
Each page in the ratings packet featured a 
complete study story, followed by its 
paired test story. Following this was a 
scale, ranging from 1 to 6, on which the 
subject rated the soundness of the match 
between the stories, with 1 being “unre- 
lated” and 6 being “extremely sound.” 
This scale was used, rather than one stress- 
ing similarity, to focus subjects on just the 
thematic similarities of the stories and away 
from overall similarity, as assessed in Ex- 
periment 3. Each page contained only one 
story pair and rating scale. 
with thematic stories receiving higher rat- 
ings. Story version also showed a main ef- 
fect, with complete-theme stories receiving 
the highest ratings overall, followed by 
theme-outcomes, and then by predict- 
themes. This was significant under both 
subjects and materials analyses, min 
F’(2,35) = 4.945, p -C .025. 
Further planned comparisons tested the 
difference between the predict-theme and 
theme-outcome conditions for thematic sto- 
ries and filler stories separately. The anal- 
ysis of thematic stories showed no signiti- 
cant effect of version (predict-theme versus 
outcome-theme) with either subjects or ma- 
terials as random factors. For filler stories, 
there was a trend toward theme-outcome 
stories being judged as more similar to the 
test stories than predict-theme stories 
were, but only under subjects analysis, 
t(29) = 1.78, p < .085. 
Discussion 
Procedure. Subjects were told to read the 
instructions and till out the pages in the rat- 
ings booklet. 
Results 
The ratings were analyzed in a 2 X 3 anal- 
ysis of variance with type of story (thematic 
or filler) and story version (complete- 
theme, predict-theme, or theme-outcome) 
as factors. The average ratings for each 
condition are shown in Table 6. 
The results showed a significant main ef- 
fect of story type for both subjects and ma- 
terials, min F’(l,24) = 41.59, p < .OOOl, 
The results of this experiment mirror 
those of Experiment 3, and most critically, 
show that the memory advantage of pre- 
dict-themes cannot be explained due to pre- 
dict-themes having greater thematic simi- 
larity to study stories than theme-outcomes 
do. The main effect of story type supports 
the claim that each story version, complete- 
theme, predict-theme, and theme-outcome, 
contained cues that were sufficient to iden- 
tify the main point, or theme, of the story as 
a whole, and allowed subjects to detect a 
high degree of similarity with the study 
story. The lack of difference between the- 
matic predict-themes and theme-outcomes 
Test story type 
_____-- 
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also suggests that the features they contain 
characterize the themes equally well under 
direct comparison. Thus, predict-themes 
were not rated as more similar to the target 
study stories than theme-outcomes were, 
ruling out a thematic similarity explanation 
for the predict-theme access advantage in 
Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiments 3 and 4 found no difference 
in the degree of similarity of predict-themes 
and outcome-themes to the study stories 
they matched. However, for distinctive- 
ness to explain the access advantage for 
predict-themes, each set of predictive fea- 
tures would have to be highly similar to its 
paired study story and relatively dissimilar 
to any others in the set, and outcome 
themes would have to be similar to several 
stories in the set. To further test this hy- 
pothesis, Experiment 5 used a direct com- 
parison method, in which subjects were al- 
lowed to look at the study stories rather 
than recall them from memory and were 
asked to write down study stories that 
matched the test stories. If the same pattern 
of results occurs as that in Experiment 2, 
this would further support a distinctiveness 
explanation for the utility of predictive fea- 
tures. 
Method 
Subjects. Forty-seven University of 
Michigan undergraduates participated in a 
single session lasting about 1 h. They re- 
ceived course credit in an introductory psy- 
chology class for participating. Subjects 
were run in groups of 20 to 30. 
Materials. The materials consisted of the 
study packet and test packet used in Exper- 
iment 2, with slightly modified instructions. 
Subjects were told to “match” the stories 
in the second packet to those in the first, 
and that they could look through the study 
packet as often as they liked, but were to go 
forward through the test packet and not re- 
turn to pages already completed. Subjects 
were not told what criterion to use in deter- 
mining whether any study stories “went 
with” each of the test stories. Subjects 
were not asked to make “thematic 
matches” (the evidence for subjects’ ability 
to match thematic stories was established 
in Seifert et al., 1986); instead, this study 
measures whether the matches that sub- 
jects make without any memory demand 
are in fact thematic matches. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same 
as that in Experiment 2, except that there 
was no distractor task between when sub- 
jects read the study stories and when they 
received the test packet. 
Results 
Responses were coded using the same 
criteria as those in Experiments 1 and 2, for 
both subjects and materials analyses. Only 
one response could not be identified as one 
of the target stories (intrusion). 
Subjects wrote down a mean of 7.2 re- 
sponses in the test packet. A within t test of 
number of double responses by story type 
(predict or outcome) showed a significant 
difference, t(46) = 3.03, p < .004 for sub- 
jects and t(7) = 2.77, p < .028 for materials, 
with means of .17 for predict-themes and 
.53 for outcome-themes. 
A t test of the number of matches in re- 
sponse to predict-theme versus theme- 
outcome stories was not significant with ei- 
ther subjects or materials as a random fac- 
tor. However, mismatches in response to 
theme-outcome stories occurred signifi- 
cantly more often than they did in response 
to predict-themes, t(46) = 3.72, p < .OOl 
with subjects as a random factor. A mate- 
rials analysis showed a trend in the same 
direction, t(14) = 1.72, p < .ll. These re- 
sults are shown in Table 7. 
The mean number of responses to pre- 
dict-theme stories and to theme-outcomes 
was also tested against the whole set 
chance estimate used in Experiment 1, 
where subjects’ reported predict-theme 
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TABLE 7 
AVERAGE PROPORTION OF RESPONSES BY ALL STORY 
VERSIONS, EXPERIMENT 5 
that would not be detected in a memory 
task, as evidenced by the relatively high 
rate of responses to filler stories. 

















matches and theme-outcome matches were 
corrected by a factor estimating chance 
performance. Both predict-theme and out- 
come-theme matches occurred at a rate sig- 
nificantly higher than the chance estimate, 
t(47) = 14.26 and t(47) = 24.49, respec- 
tively, p < JO01 for both. The two condi- 
tions averaged 1.3 and 1.51 observations in 
excess of chance, respectively. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment support 
distinctiveness as an explanation of the 
findings in Experiment 2; specifically, that 
predict-theme cues are more distinctive, 
yet not more similar, in regard to the study 
stories than are outcome-theme cues. In 
Experiment 5, outcome-theme stories were 
more than twice as likely to result in mul- 
tiple responses per story, and the results 
again showed that, although both types of 
stories resulted in a large number of 
matches, outcome-theme stories received 
more mismatch responses than predict- 
theme stories did. Thus, whereas the pre- 
dictive and the outcome elements of a story 
are equally similar to the target case, the 
two feature sets differ in how uniquely they 
characterize elements that discriminate the 
target from distracters. 
The results of the experiments presented 
here provide support for a functional ap- 
proach to the organization of cases in mem- 
ory, as suggested by Schank (1982). A func- 
tional analysis suggests that for one to ben- 
efit from potentially useful abstract 
similarities between cases when planning, 
one must have access to prior cases and the 
planning information they contain before a 
complete thematic structure (defined as 
themes from cultural adages) is evident in 
the new situation; otherwise one will not 
benefit from memory of prior mistakes be- 
fore the outcome is determined. Thus, fea- 
tures in the input that predict potential 
problems, as opposed to other sets of ab- 
stract features, should lead to more reliable 
access to failure information, as proposed 
by the predictive-features hypothesis. 
In the first two experiments, stories with 
incomplete thematic structures led to re- 
mindings at a rate much higher than that 
expected by chance, suggesting that one 
need not receive an entire thematic pattern 
before accessing a related case in memory. 
As might be expected, having a complete 
pattern results in better retrieval because 
this potentially allows the most complete 
match with material stored in memory. 
However, the fact that the number of 
matches based on incomplete feature sets 
significantly exceeded the number of spuri- 
ous remindings suggests that, for the most 
part, remindings potentially useful to a 
planner occurred. 
The finding that matches occurred at a The results also support the hypothe- 
rate much higher than chance for both sized advantage of predictive features over 
types of feature sets, and the overall high outcome features in recall. In planning sit- 
number of responses, is consistent with the uations, the most useful similarities would 
fact that the task involved direct compari- be those that let one anticipate potential 
son of similarities and not comparison from problems before they occur. In a function- 
memory. This direct method may encour- ally organized memory, such predictive 
age responding based on vague similarities cues could be used to index knowledge 
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structures that contain planning informa- 
tion on how to avoid potential pitfalls. The 
results are consistent with case-based rea- 
soning models (Hammond, 1989; Kolodner, 
1983; Riesbeck & Schank, 1989; Schank, 
1982) which propose that one tends to en- 
code the goal-relevant or predictive fea- 
tures of an episode, as inferred during ini- 
tial comprehension. These features are then 
used to index the episode within memory. 
Then, if one discovers the same features 
while understanding a new case, previous 
instances sharing those indices will be re- 
trieved as a result of this functional organi- 
zation of memory. 
The experimental results presented here 
suggest that, under such a memory organi- 
zation, clusters of partial abstract features 
that predict previously experienced plan- 
ning failures lead not to more, but to more 
reliable access to relevant previous in- 
stances than do other abstract, equally sim- 
ilar associated features. When provided 
with just outcome-theme features, subjects 
accessed more mismatches than they did 
with predictive features, suggesting that the 
outcome features do not provide informa- 
tion that is as specifically tied to a particular 
theme. Outcomes of planning decisions 
may share broader abstract commonalities 
such as “plan successful” and “plan fails” 
and therefore would not identify any one 
specific planning scenario over any other. 
Thus, the perceived features that are likely 
to index into prior related cases will be ex- 
actly the features that detect important fac- 
tors in making the planning decision and 
that distinguish this case from other, re- 
lated planning cases. That is, people will 
learn the features that are helpful in decid- 
ing what to do (and what not to do) and that 
separate that type of decision from other 
related types. More generally, the claim is 
that, although one can encode cases and 
retrieve them from memory based on a va- 
riety of similar features, one will most often 
and most successfully utilize the set that 
includes the causal features that identify 
the specific planning problem, both in 
terms of grouping similar cases together 
and of distinguishing them from other cases 
with other similarities. 
An alternative explanation for these re- 
sults is that the predictive and outcome sto- 
ries differed in their thematic similarity to 
the original study stories. However, the re- 
sults of Experiments 3 and 4 rule out this 
interpretation, because subjects rated the 
two types of incomplete thematic stories as 
equally similar to the source stories. This 
suggests that the advantage for the predic- 
tive features is not that they are more sim- 
ilar overall, nor that they contain more the- 
matic information and are therefore more 
similar to prior cases, but that the predic- 
tive features provide more distinctive ac- 
cess to directly relevant cases. The results 
of Experiment 5 further support a distinc- 
tiveness explanation, as more spurious re- 
mindings occurred in response to theme- 
outcome stories than predictive ones in di- 
rect (rather than memory) comparison as 
well. The results suggest that different 
kinds of abstract similarities can affect ac- 
cess based on factors other than their over- 
all or thematic similarity to a previous, 
“best-matching” case in memory. Distinc- 
tiveness, rather than similarity, is the criti- 
cal determinant of retrieval when the pool 
of potential matches increases to several 
candidates that may match equally well. 
Distinctiveness is certainly not a new prin- 
ciple in theories of memory retrieval (see 
Crowder, 1976), but its importance has 
been overlooked in previous work on anal- 
ogy, perhaps because of the tendency to 
study analogical relationships that are far 
removed from other cases in memory 
(Hammond, Seifert, & Gray, 1991). 
A potentially confounding factor is that 
the predictive features are always placed in 
the first part of the stories used, suggesting 
that some sort of primacy effect, and not 
the nature of the features themselves, could 
account for our results. If subjects have 
better memory for the initial elements of 
the study stories, then they should find 
matching the predict-theme test stories eas- 
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ier than matching the theme-outcomes. 
However, it is not clear that primacy ef- 
fects would occur within individual stories, 
as opposed to within the set of stories. Sub- 
jects may have better recall for whole sto- 
ries that they encountered first in the study 
packets, but this in itself would not favor 
predictive features over outcomes. Fur- 
ther, if the unit of analysis is the individual 
story, one might expect both primacy and 
recency effects, with the middle of the 
story forgotten. Again, this would not favor 
predictive features over outcomes. 
The reminding methodology used in the 
first two experiments may actually under- 
estimate the number of cases one can ac- 
cess with incomplete patterns. The experi- 
mental task required subjects to write down 
a story that matched the test story. Sub- 
jects may have been reminded of a case but 
felt it was inappropriate to report as a 
match per se; this was more likely to occur 
in the incomplete story conditions, where 
less information was available to identify a 
theme with certainty. Editing remindings 
seems common, especially in tasks like 
conversation, where appropriateness is an 
important consideration. In a problem- 
solving task, defined as such, subjects may 
more willingly report and use remindings 
based on incomplete thematic patterns. 
These findings also provide further evi- 
dence for the validity of thematic knowl- 
edge structures in human memory (Dyer, 
1983; Seifert et al., 1986) and they extend 
work on the role of structural features in 
analogical access (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
Holyoak, 1985; Ross, 1989a) by showing 
that even incomplete patterns containing 
such features can be effective. The focus on 
complete feature sets in prior research on 
access to analogies may result in failing to 
detect the patterns of similarities that peo- 
ple can utilize in planning and problem 
solving. For example, in materials drawn 
from Gentner and Landers (1985), two sto- 
ries may share many first-order relations 
early on (Gentner, 1989) yet have different 
endings. For example, a bird gives feathers 
to a hunter and later is either shot with an 
arrow Retched with its own feathers, or 
spared when recognized as the hunter’s 
benefactor. Taken in the context of whole 
stories, these two outcomes are not analo- 
gous; however, if considered only up to the 
decision point (whether to give the feath- 
ers), the two stories could be considered 
analogous, and in a planning situation both 
could lead to valuable remindings (Ham- 
mond et al., 1991). The feature sets charac- 
terizing abstract themes are not simply un- 
ordered clusters of shared features; in- 
stead, they are organized by causal links. 
Thus, predictive features stand in a partic- 
ular causal relationship to the conclusory 
outcomes. 
The findings also broaden the view of 
analogy in suggesting that the set of all com- 
monalities one can detect in post hoc com- 
parisons is not necessarily the same as the 
set of commonalities available for use in 
memory retrieval. For example, the appli- 
cability of the convergence solution to both 
the General and the Ray problem (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980) certainly contributes to the 
high overall similarity when in a rating task, 
but since that solution is not present in the 
Ray problem as presented, it can be of little 
use in access. Although Gick and Holyoak 
(1980, 1983) found a low rate of remindings 
without a retrieval hint (about a third of the 
subjects), the ones that did occur would 
have involved matching based on partial 
features. For problem-solving settings, a 
less-than-complete set of matching features 
will be available, requiring a process model 
of analogy that can account for access in- 
volving incomplete comparisons. 
One could argue that the distinctiveness 
effect occurs in the experimental materials 
but might not generalize beyond them. 
However, to eliminate the effect found 
here, one would have to find themes with 
relatively confusable predictive elements 
and much more specific outcomes. This 
could be difficult, because for a set of fea- 
tures to actually be predictive, they need to 
pick out a certain outcome and not be as- 
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sociated with many outcomes. Confusabil- 
ity of predictive features would diminish 
their usefulness as predictors (by defini- 
tion). Although there may be some distinc- 
tions among abstract features that charac- 
terize outcomes, there are likely to be 
fewer different kinds than there are poten- 
tial distinctions among predictive features, 
which include conditions and constraints 
involved in selecting an appropriate plan. 
Any feature set with similarly defined pre- 
dictive power will lead to more reliable 
(though not necessarily more) access. What 
is, in fact, predictive could vary by domain 
and by task, as far as what one needs to 
predict, when, and what information is 
available at the time. Thus, predictive 
power is only one of many possible forms of 
distinctiveness within a set of cases. It is 
simply the specific relationship of informa- 
tion contained in predictive features to the 
prediction that needs to be made that is the 
reason for their advantage in selecting the 
most helpful prior cases in memory. 
In summary, the results provide evidence 
that one can access cases in memory that 
share abstract features, even when given 
incomplete cues. Thus, one can access 
valuable, cross-contextual planning infor- 
mation before observing a total set of 
matching abstract features. From a func- 
tional perspective, the most useful of these 
incomplete feature sets will contain ele- 
ments that predict potential problems, and 
allow access to relevant cases before one 
must make a planning decision, thereby im- 
proving the planner’s ability to predict and 
avoid planning failures. These findings are 
consistent with work in case-based reason- 
ing (Hammond, 1989; Kolodner, 1983; 
Riesbeck & &hank, 1989; Schank, 1982) 
which proposes that planners use moditica- 
tions of analogous past experiences to solve 
problems in addition to problem-solving 
rules. These results also suggest a func- 
tional approach to indexing for use in plan- 
ning systems. Further research is needed to 
discover functional feature sets appropriate 
to other tasks and domains, to extend the 
general principle of functionality in mem- 
ory indexing. 
APPENDIX 
Key: A letter by a story element means that the 
story version contains that element. 
s Study story 
C Complete-theme test story 
P Predict-theme test story 
0 Theme-outcome test story 









(1) X has goal. 
(2) X needs other resources to achieve 
it. 
(3) Access to source A readily avail- 
able. 
(4) X fails to take into account A’s re- 
liability. 
(5) X accepts A’s advice. 
(6) X executes recommended plan. 
(7) X fails to achieve goal. 










(1) X has goal. 
(2) X invests resources in plan. 
(3) Plan fails. 
(4) X does not assess reasons for fail- 
ure. 
(5) X invests more resources in same 
plan. 
(6) Plan again fails. 
(7) X is left without resources. 
Theme: Counting Your Chickens before 
They’ve Hatched 
Elements: 
SCP (1) X desires A. 
SCP (2) X assumes A. 
SCP (3) X does not act to ensure or verify 
A. 
SC 0 (4) X invests resources based on A. 
SC 0 (5) A does not occur. 
c 0 (6) X has used up resources for noth- 
ing. 
Theme: Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth 
Elements: 
SCPO (1) X and Y have the same (token) 
goal. 
SCP (2) X and Y have plans. 
S (3) X and Y’s plans together will miss 
goal. 
666 JOHNSON AND SEIFERT 
SCPO (4) X and Y do not communicate to co- 
ordinate actions. 
(5) X and Y execute plans indepen- 
dently. 
SC 0 (6) Interaction of plans does not 
achieve goal. 
Theme: Cutting off Your Nose to Spite 
Your Face 
Elements: 
SCPO (1) X has goal. 
SCP (2) X needs additional resources from 
source A. 
SCP (3) Source A does not provide re- 
sources. 
SCPO (4) X uses force on A. 
SC 0 (5) Force has negligible effect on A. 
SC 0 (6) Force destroys resources X has al- 
ready. 
Theme: The Cure is Worse than 
the Disease 
Elements: 
SCPO (1) X has goal. 
SCP (2) X acts to achieve goal. 
SCP (3) Plan falls short of goal but differ- 
ence between present state and 
goal is small. 
SC 0 (4) X acts to minimize difference. 
SC 0 (5) Action results in a state worse than 
the previous state. 
Theme: Closing the Barn Door after the 
Horse is Gone 
Elements: 
SCP (1) X has goal. 
S (2) X is aware of potential goal block- 
age. 
SCP (3) X has knowledge of solution. 
SCPO (4) X has power to execute solution. 
SCP (5) X does not take action. 
SCPO (6) Goal gets blocked. 
SC 0 (7) Solution conditions change. 
SC 0 (8) X executes original solution any- 
way. 
SC 0 (9) Executed solution doesn’t work. 
Theme: Pot Calling the Kettle “Black” 
Elements: 
SCP (1) X states an extreme opinion. 
CP (2) X has motive for contradiction. 
SC (3) X has opportunity for contradic- 
tion. 
SC (4) X acts contrary to stated opinion. 
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